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FOREWORD 
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems explores the phenomenon of 
international delegation, which, as defined in the introductory article, involves a 
grant of authority by states to an international body. The articles contained in 
this issue are the product of two conferences at Duke Law School at which legal 
scholars and political scientists developed and discussed articles concerning The 
Law and Politics of International Delegation. The articles focus on the 
conceptual, normative, and empirical aspects of international delegation. 
Because these articles grew out of the lively discussions at both conferences, our 
thanks extend not only to the contributors to this issue, but also to the other 
conference participants: Rachel Brewster, Andrew Guzman, Bruce Jentleson, 
Robert Keohane, David Lake, Jennifer Landsidle, Joost Pauwelyn, Mark 
Pollack, Eric Posner, Christopher Schroeder, Edward Swaine, and Ernest 
Young. We would also like to thank Dana Norvell for her terrific administrative 
assistance in connection with the conferences. 
I 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
This issue begins with three conceptual articles. The first, authored by the 
two of us, defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from 
both a legal and social-science perspective. The second, by Karen Alter, 
explores in greater depth the variation in international delegation to 
international courts. Lastly, David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran draw on 
their expertise concerning domestic delegation to develop a model of 
international delegation showing the conditions under which states agree to 
delegate sovereignty to international organizations, when states exit such 
arrangements, and the circumstances under which an international organization 
will be most effective. 
In our introductory article, The Concept of International Delegation, we 
define an international delegation as a grant of authority by two or more states 
to an international body to make decisions or take actions. Going beyond 
traditional analysis of international delegation, we seek to capture the 
multilayered nature of international delegation by considering grants of 
authority not only to bureaucracies, but also to collective bodies, subgroups of 
states, and courts. Our article then identifies eight types of authority that states 
may grant: legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, 
agenda-setting, research and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation. 
Next, the article discusses how the extent of an international delegation can 
vary depending on its legal effect and on the degree of independence of the 
international body. These multiple levels of differentiation demonstrate that the 
nature of international delegation varies greatly and that typological precision is 
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therefore needed to avoid misleading overgeneralizations when considering the 
desirability and legality of any particular delegation. In light of this typology, 
the article then considers some of the benefits and costs of international 
delegation. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the questions 
raised by the typology and its implications for further research. 
Karen Alter’s article, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. 
Other-Binding Delegation, highlights the diverse nature of international 
delegations to courts. She argues that the roles and tasks delegated to 
international courts increasingly mimic in form and content the broad variety of 
tasks delegated to courts in liberal democracies, but that delegating these tasks 
to international courts is fundamentally different than delegating them to 
domestic courts because of the implications for national sovereignty. Whereas 
international courts were initially established to be dispute-resolution bodies, 
they now also perform administrative review, enforcement, and even 
constitutional review. Alter explains how each of these judicial roles binds other 
actors, binds states, or both. Analyzing twenty founding treaties for 
international courts, her article also shows that delegation to international 
courts is extensive, and growing. 
In their article, Sovereignty and Delegation in International Organizations, 
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran present a formal model of international 
delegation. They begin by describing two differences between international 
delegation and domestic delegation. First, they note that states freely enter into 
international organizations and can often exit them as they like. Second, it is 
often the case that the more states that join an international organization, the 
greater the benefits for all involved; that is, international organizations often 
display network externalities. Their formal model incorporates these elements 
and derives conditions under which states will agree to delegate sovereignty to 
international organizations and when they will decide to exit such 
arrangements. Epstein and O’Halloran argue that international organizations 
are most effective when preferences are homogeneous and when the potential 
benefits of cooperation are high. Their model also suggests that, up to a point, 
outlier countries may wield higher influence in international organizations. 
II 
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
Turning to more normative considerations, the articles by Neil Siegel and 
Oona Hathaway discuss the effects of international delegation on the values of 
federalism and sovereignty, respectively. 
In International Delegation and the Values of Federalism, Siegel argues that 
the relationship between an international delegation and the values thought to 
be promoted by a federal structure of government depends upon what would 
happen in the absence of the international delegation. Focusing on the effect of 
international delegation on U.S. subnational states, Siegel explains that when 
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the delegation replaces regulation by the federal government that would have 
displaced state choices anyway, then the effect on federalism values depends on 
the relative inclinations of the federal government and the international body to 
decentralize. When, however, there would be no federal regulation in the 
absence of an international delegation, so that the delegation reduces state 
autonomy, then the justifications for international delegations, whether 
constitutional or prudential, do not include the values commonly understood to 
be associated with federalism. In this situation, the assertion that international 
delegations diffuse political power is unpersuasive: power is more diffused when 
fifty subnational states maintain control than when authority is delegated to one 
international body. When international delegations reduce state control, 
moreover, they compromise every other value that federalism is commonly 
thought to advance. 
In her article, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, Hathaway 
rebuts the claim that state sovereignty almost always suffers when states 
delegate authority to international institutions. Critics of delegation err, she 
contends, by overemphasizing the costs but losing sight of some of the 
substantial benefits of cooperation. She considers the challenge to sovereignty 
posed by international delegation by focusing on recent debates over the 
influence of international legal commitments on domestic governance. The 
scope of conflict between sovereignty and international delegation is 
substantially narrowed, she reasons, when we take account of state consent to 
delegation. Indeed, because of consent, international delegation can often be 
seen as an exercise of state sovereign authority rather than a diminution of it. 
She then explores how the intrusion of international law into areas that were 
once exclusively domestic might be explained and justified. She argues that by 
exploring both sides of the traditional cost-benefit equation, we can come to a 
deeper and more empirically grounded argument about the proper role of 
international law and delegation in an age of global interdependence. 
III 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
The remainder of the issue concentrates on empirical inquiries into the 
phenomenon of international delegation. The section starts with Barbara 
Koremenos’ overview of the incidence of various types of delegation in 
international agreements and the various factors that correlate with this 
variation. Four articles addressing the consequences of delegation follow, each 
focusing on a specific example: the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body, and the weapons-inspection regime 
in Iraq from 1991 to 2003. 
In her article, When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?, Barbara 
Koremenos demonstrates that international delegation is an important and 
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nontrivial empirical phenomenon. Using an extensive data set created from the 
United Nations Treaty Series, she finds that almost half of all international 
agreements involve delegation of some kind. By exploring the institutional 
design choices of international delegation, she finds that dispute resolution is 
the most commonly delegated function and often involves externally delegating 
authority to an existing arbitration tribunal or an international court. 
Furthermore, she finds that external delegation in particular increases with the 
existence of complex cooperation problems such as enforcement and 
uncertainty and with the heterogeneity and number of parties. Some of her 
findings open up areas for further research. For example, it appears that 
delegation may decrease with the average level of democracy of the signatories, 
but is unrelated to the existence of a superpower signatory or to the risk 
aversion of signing states. 
Laurence Helfer’s article, Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: 
The ILO Experience, challenges the conventional wisdom that the delegation of 
authority to the ILO involves only modest sovereignty costs. Helfer explains 
that the ILO has increasingly exercised the authority to monitor compliance 
with unratified labor treaties and recommendations, and that the exercise of 
this authority has significant effects. He further notes that this type of 
monitoring authority is not confined to the ILO, but in fact exists in several 
other international institutions and issue areas. The case of the ILO therefore 
suggests that some important delegations arise and thrive outside of the formal 
channels of authority. This makes it essential for scholars to look beyond treaty 
texts and institutional design features to consider how power is actually 
exercised within international organizations and how the costs and benefits of 
international delegations change over time. Helfer also argues that monitoring 
compliance with unconsented-to legal rules is an alternative institutional 
response to a problem that many international organizations confront: how to 
ensure that all states affected by a cooperation problem participate in the 
resolution of that problem rather than free-ride on the efforts of other 
countries. 
Tim Büthe tells a different story of how international delegation can be 
highly consequential and not fully anticipated by states. In The Globalization of 
Health and Safety Standards, he examines why states delegated regulatory 
authority in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Measures, an integral part of the founding treaty of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Büthe argues that, to explain this case of international 
delegation, principal–agent theory must be complemented by an analysis of 
cost-benefit calculations of the relevant domestic interest groups. Given these 
domestic interests, governments decided to institutionalize international 
cooperation on SPS measures outside of the WTO because they believed that 
such delegation would minimize the political costs of the loss of policymaking 
autonomy. Büthe notes, however, that in retrospect it appears that the 
widespread positive association of international standards with multilateralism 
and international consensus led many countries to underestimate those 
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autonomy losses. Material and ideational factors thus interacted to shape the 
definition of national interests and the outcome of international delegation.  
In their article, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on 
U.S. Trade Politics, Judith Goldstein and Richard Steinberg argue that the 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body has been able to use its authority to 
engage in judicial lawmaking to reduce trade barriers in ways that would not 
otherwise have been possible through negotiation. This lawmaking authority 
was not the result of a purposeful delegation; rather, it was an unintended 
byproduct of the creation of an underspecified set of rules and procedures. 
There is nevertheless a high rate of compliance with Appellate Body decisions 
because decentralized enforcement can induce domestic importers to lobby for 
trade liberalization. In the United States, this judicial lawmaking may also allow 
the President to achieve trade policies that are more liberal than those desired 
by Congress, if compliance can be achieved by a regulatory change or by sole 
Executive action. 
In the final article, Delegation Success and Policy Failure: Collective 
Delegation and the Search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, Michael 
Tierney argues that international delegation can have important consequences, 
even for powerful states. In particular, he contends that the U.S. delegation of 
inspection authority to United Nations weapons inspectors and to the 
International Atomic Energy Association after the Gulf War of 1990–91 
entailed significant sovereignty costs by affecting the timing and costliness of 
the subsequent 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Among other things, he notes that 
the inspectors’ independent behavior made it much more difficult for the 
United States to assemble the type of multilateral coalition that would share the 
costs as it had in the earlier Gulf War. Tierney also notes that this example 
shows how different states can pay different costs as the result of the same 
episode of international delegation. 
Together, these articles contribute new theoretical insights, discuss 
important normative questions, and enhance the empirical research of 
international delegation. This range of approaches highlights the interplay of 
the law and politics of international delegation, an aspect of international 
relations that continues to gain importance as the world grows more 
interdependent.  
 
Curtis A. Bradley 
Judith G. Kelley 
